Comments on entry #58365

On Trivial Pursuits

Saturday the Twenty-Ninth of August, Two Thousand and Nine

"Heresy was good; heresy meant opportunity."

I spoke with Sumana recently (her blog is back!), and she told me I should read Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, the story of how the Oakland A's, one of baseball's dirt-poorest teams, managed to put together a winning team by finding undervalued players, using statistics no one else was looking at (called "sabermetrics"). Experience has taught me that if Sumana tells you to do something, it is basically always a good idea to do it. This is one of those cases, because I never would have picked up this book on my own—it's hard to imagine a concept more immediately boring to me than the combination of baseball and statistics.

But in the end, it's not really about either. What's really fascinating about the book (and what led me to devour it in a day) is what it dances around: the coming of the Age of the Geek to an industry that had been assumed to be geekproof. As it turns out, not even professional sports are immune to the awesome power of a bespectacled dweeb with a laptop, and a lot of the tension in the book comes from the friction between the old-school jocks and their new bosses, a gaggle of nerds who come in and tell them they're doing everything wrong. Obviously that's fun to read just from a "nerd power!" perspective, but it's also fascinating to think of all the other industries still out there, plagued by chronic inefficiencies (i.e. opportunities) and just begging for the right nerd to come along and revolutionize them. (Mind you, easier said than done: the only reason it was possible with baseball is that people have been collecting stats on every single baseball game for 150 years or so.)

Of course, given that baseball is a sport, the question (not explicitly addressed in the book, but again danced around) is—do we really want our sports to be optimally efficient? The best players, from a sabermetric point of view, are the ones who take very long at-bats (to tire out the pitcher), are happy with getting walked, never steal bases, and generally don't sparkle. Throughout the book, the A's resident sabermetrician, Paul DePodesta, refers to one of the players he would most like to sign, Kevin Youkilis, as "Euclis, the Greek god of walks". Sabermetricians love walks because they improve the team's field position and increase the likelihood of a run that inning, but do fans? And because of their focus on a player's ability to get on base, either by being walked or hitting, sabermetricians are happy to ignore... well, pretty much everything else about that player, really. Youkilis, for example, is described in the book as "a fat third baseman who couldn't run, throw, or field"—and that's quite charitable compared to the descriptions of poor Jeremy Brown. From the perspective of winning games and therefore making money—which is all the A's could afford to think about—the sabermetric approach may work, but I certainly can't imagine it making baseball any more interesting. As fascinating as I found this book, I found myself wondering if I would have been able to stay awake through all of the games described in it. Really, the ultimate fault for that lies not with the sabermetricians—show a geek an inefficient system that can be gamed through intelligence and analysis, and they'll do so just for the fun of it—but with the ridiculous salaries players began to get in the free agency era (which made sabermetrics a business rather than a hobby) and with the structure of the game itself. If the ability to get on base is so incredibly important that it trumps even the most basic elements of athleticism, then it is baseball itself that is broken, at least insofar as it's a sport.

All that said, a story about geeks beating jocks on their home turf is hard to pass up, and it's both well-told and full of interesting thoughts that apply to more than just baseball. I know it's not exactly new or groundbreaking—the book's been out six years—but it's new to me, so I get to blog about it.

posted by Martin Marks at 8:33 in the evening // four comments


Well, getting on base is still everything, but good news materialized for athleticsm: Moneyball was so influential so quickly that nothing in it provides a competitive advantage on a large scale anymore. The stat nerds now concentrate on the stuff they previously ignored because trustworthy numbers weren't available. (They got budgets and started collecting new data.) Fielding, baserunning, and pitch location are the big areas of interest right now.

Because the A's are still poor and advantage-hungry and everybody's got a staff of stat nerds now, they're focused on scouts more than stats these days.

Also, if Moneyball had been written 20 years before, it would have been set in Baltimore. Earl Weaver kept all kinds of then-strange stats on index cards in the Oriole dugout starting in the 70s. He and the rest of the old A.L. East kept the dread Yankees out of the playoffs for 15 years from the 80s through the early 90s by playing 'proto-Moneyball,' It was pretty exciting.

comment by Mike // Saturday, the 29th of August, 2009, at 11:40 at night

Be careful. It's a slippery slope. I ended up having opinions about competing defensive win share methodologies before remembering that I hated watching baseball.

Youk doesn't really hurt the spectacle of baseball as much as batters like Nomar or pitchers like Dice-K. They're both perfectly flashy players who just take absolutely forever to get ready for each pitch. It's nothing a timer couldn't fix.

One of the issues with Moneyball is that one of the advantages those A's teams sought to exploit was an open attitude towards drug cheats, something he leaves out.

Basketball is the brave new frontier for stat geekery, by the way. If you want to see people having extremely strong opinions about utter trivialities, you can't beat the debates about whether Allen Iverson was ever actually a useful basketball player.

comment by Tim // Sunday, the 30th of August, 2009, at 12:02 at night

Yeah, as I was reading it, I kept thinking: "man, the single most stupid thing Billy Beane does throughout the course of this book is talking with the author of this book." Talk about a victim of his own success. I wonder: if he had kept the whole sabermetrics approach on the downlow, picked his WTF players like Brown in the fifth round instead of the first, let his manager look like the boss while privately keeping him on a short leash, and kept his geeks well out of the spotlight, would he have had more success or less? Not only would it have kept everyone else from trying the same thing, but it would have prevented the head-butting between him and the entire rest of the industry. A few clever geeks like Bill James would have noticed that his picks were clearly based on stats rather than scouts, but how many jocks were listening to Bill James before Billy Beane came along? They would have all thought what most of them wanted to think anyway: "man, Billy Beane is the luckiest SOB in baseball." If he had done that, won a few games, gave the A's owners a healthy-but-not-flashy ROI for a few years, then either moved on to a richer team or start ramping up his sabermetric progream, it would have probably been better for him, better for the A's, and maybe better for baseball. Worse for geeks, sure, and obviously I love the story of the badass number-crunching David versus the deep-pocketed Goliaths, but then David himself pretty much peaked at his coronation, you know? Billy Beane saw the Bathsheba of fame in the tub and, um, killed the Uriah the Hittite of... prudence? IT IS NOT A PERFECT METAPHOR.

comment by Martin // Sunday, the 30th of August, 2009, at 12:51 at night

Well, the advantages in the book were already gone by the time of publication. The A's made the playoffs every year between 2000 and 2003 on a tiny payroll. In an industry where many staff meetings get reported in the newspaper, word got around, sufficiently for Michael Lewis to be aware. (He's hasn't been 'ahead of the curve' on anything he's written since Liar's Poker.) Theo Epstein set up shop in Boston in '02, Bill James was hired there in '03, and Paul DePodesta had been shopping around for a job for a while when he left Oakland for Los Angeles in early '04.

Following Tim: Jason Giambi gets relatively little coverage in the book, IIRC, because he was gone by the time Lewis showed up, but he was the team's steroid mascot of that era. He led the AL in OBP in 2000 and 2001.

comment by Mike // Sunday, the 30th of August, 2009, at 10:01 in the morning

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